Files
waggle-os/SECURITY.md
shumeiko.it a369fb95f3 docs: use project contacts in SECURITY.md and the code of conduct (P2.4)
Drop the personal email address. Security reports go through GitHub
private vulnerability reporting, with hello@egzakta.com as the fallback;
the code of conduct points security reports there too. Add a
supported-versions table for the first community release and update
the scope to the desktop app, the server installer and the shipped
packages.
2026-11-01 01:54:23 +01:00

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2.8 KiB
Markdown

# Security Policy
Waggle runs on the user's own computer and handles sensitive material: provider API keys,
connector credentials, the local file system, chats and memories. We take reports seriously
and appreciate responsible disclosure.
[`THREAT_MODEL.md`](./THREAT_MODEL.md) describes the trust boundary, the controls that enforce
it and the known gaps.
## Supported versions
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| The latest community edition release | Yes |
| Earlier community edition releases | No. Update to the latest release. |
| Unreleased code on the default branch | Best effort |
The commercial Waggle OS product is not covered by this policy.
## Reporting a vulnerability
**Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.**
1. **GitHub private vulnerability reporting (preferred).** On the repository, open the
**Security** tab and choose **Report a vulnerability**. The report is visible only to the
maintainers.
2. **Email, if you cannot use GitHub.** Write to **hello@egzakta.com** with `SECURITY` in the
subject line.
Please include:
- what the issue is and the impact you expect;
- steps to reproduce it, or a proof of concept;
- the affected component and the version or commit;
- your environment: operating system, desktop app or server installer, and the model provider
if it matters.
## What to expect
- An acknowledgement within 5 business days.
- An assessment and a severity rating after that.
- Coordinated disclosure: we agree on a timeline with you and credit you in the release notes
unless you prefer to stay anonymous.
Please give us reasonable time to release a fix before you disclose the issue publicly.
## Scope
In scope:
- the desktop app (the Tauri shell and its bundled server);
- the server installer (`packages/launcher`) and the server archives it installs;
- the web UI (`apps/web`) and the shipped packages under `packages/`;
- memory (`packages/memory-contract`, `packages/memory-mem0`);
- prompt-injection paths, secret handling in the vault, the file-system boundary, the local
API's authentication, and the approval gates.
Out of scope:
- the known gaps listed in `THREAT_MODEL.md`, such as the pattern-based injection scanner and
the absence of an operating-system sandbox for shell commands. If you can show impact beyond
what is documented there, we still want to hear about it;
- findings that need control of the user's account or physical access to the computer: the user
is trusted by design;
- team mode packages (`packages/team-server`, `packages/waggle-dance`, `packages/worker`), which
are not built or shipped in this edition;
- third-party services that Waggle connects to.
## Secrets
If a report involves an exposed secret (an API key, a token or a credential), say so clearly so
it can be rotated at once. Never put live secrets in a public issue or pull request.