# Security Policy Waggle runs on the user's own computer and handles sensitive material: provider API keys, connector credentials, the local file system, chats and memories. We take reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure. [`THREAT_MODEL.md`](./THREAT_MODEL.md) describes the trust boundary, the controls that enforce it and the known gaps. ## Supported versions | Version | Supported | |---|---| | The latest community edition release | Yes | | Earlier community edition releases | No. Update to the latest release. | | Unreleased code on the default branch | Best effort | The commercial Waggle OS product is not covered by this policy. ## Reporting a vulnerability **Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.** 1. **GitHub private vulnerability reporting (preferred).** On the repository, open the **Security** tab and choose **Report a vulnerability**. The report is visible only to the maintainers. 2. **Email, if you cannot use GitHub.** Write to **hello@egzakta.com** with `SECURITY` in the subject line. Please include: - what the issue is and the impact you expect; - steps to reproduce it, or a proof of concept; - the affected component and the version or commit; - your environment: operating system, desktop app or server installer, and the model provider if it matters. ## What to expect - An acknowledgement within 5 business days. - An assessment and a severity rating after that. - Coordinated disclosure: we agree on a timeline with you and credit you in the release notes unless you prefer to stay anonymous. Please give us reasonable time to release a fix before you disclose the issue publicly. ## Scope In scope: - the desktop app (the Tauri shell and its bundled server); - the server installer (`packages/launcher`) and the server archives it installs; - the web UI (`apps/web`) and the shipped packages under `packages/`; - memory (`packages/memory-contract`, `packages/memory-mem0`); - prompt-injection paths, secret handling in the vault, the file-system boundary, the local API's authentication, and the approval gates. Out of scope: - the known gaps listed in `THREAT_MODEL.md`, such as the pattern-based injection scanner and the absence of an operating-system sandbox for shell commands. If you can show impact beyond what is documented there, we still want to hear about it; - findings that need control of the user's account or physical access to the computer: the user is trusted by design; - team mode packages (`packages/team-server`, `packages/waggle-dance`, `packages/worker`), which are not built or shipped in this edition; - third-party services that Waggle connects to. ## Secrets If a report involves an exposed secret (an API key, a token or a credential), say so clearly so it can be rotated at once. Never put live secrets in a public issue or pull request.