This commit is contained in:
Oleg Maslov
2026-09-02 10:14:22 +02:00
parent 0c3e2ead3b
commit b20b138fe4
771 changed files with 161561 additions and 9027 deletions

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
*/
import type { LLMCallFn } from './pipeline.js';
import { scanForInjection } from '../injection-scanner.js';
import { createCoreLogger } from '../logger.js';
import { evaluateExternalMemoryIngress } from '../memory-ingress-guard.js';
import { isNoiseName, normalizeEntityName } from '../mind/entity-normalizer.js';
import type { KnowledgeGraph } from '../mind/knowledge.js';
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ function unwrapFencedBlock(text: string): string {
*/
function parseJsonlOutput(raw: string, validFrameIds: ReadonlySet<number>): KgEntity[] {
const entities: KgEntity[] = [];
const seenEntityFrames = new Set<string>();
const cleaned = unwrapFencedBlock(raw);
for (const line of cleaned.split('\n')) {
@@ -146,13 +147,16 @@ function parseJsonlOutput(raw: string, validFrameIds: ReadonlySet<number>): KgEn
let parsed: Record<string, unknown>;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed) as Record<string, unknown>;
const value: unknown = JSON.parse(trimmed);
if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) continue;
parsed = value as Record<string, unknown>;
} catch {
continue;
}
const frameId = Number(parsed.frame_id);
if (!Number.isFinite(frameId) || !validFrameIds.has(frameId)) continue;
const frameId = parsed.frame_id;
if (typeof frameId !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(frameId) ||
!validFrameIds.has(frameId)) continue;
const name = typeof parsed.name === 'string' ? parsed.name.trim() : '';
if (name.length < 2) continue;
@@ -163,12 +167,17 @@ function parseJsonlOutput(raw: string, validFrameIds: ReadonlySet<number>): KgEn
const rawType = typeof parsed.type === 'string' ? parsed.type.toLowerCase().trim() : '';
if (!(KG_ENTITY_TYPES as readonly string[]).includes(rawType)) continue;
const scan = scanForInjection(name, 'tool_output');
if (!scan.safe) {
log.warn('dropping extracted entity name with injection payload', { flags: scan.flags.join(',') });
const ingress = evaluateExternalMemoryIngress({ content: name });
if (ingress.action !== 'allow') {
log.warn('dropping extracted entity name with injection payload', {
flags: ingress.scan.flags.join(','),
});
continue;
}
const entityFrameKey = JSON.stringify([frameId, normalizeEntityName(name)]);
if (seenEntityFrames.has(entityFrameKey)) continue;
seenEntityFrames.add(entityFrameKey);
entities.push({ frameId, name, type: rawType as KgEntityType });
}
@@ -214,7 +223,14 @@ export interface WriteKgEntitiesResult {
function safeParseProps(raw: string | undefined | null): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!raw) return {};
try { return JSON.parse(raw) as Record<string, unknown>; } catch { return {}; }
try {
const value: unknown = JSON.parse(raw);
return value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)
? value as Record<string, unknown>
: {};
} catch {
return {};
}
}
/**
@@ -231,37 +247,54 @@ export function writeKgEntities(
kg: KnowledgeGraph,
extraction: KgEntityExtraction,
): WriteKgEntitiesResult {
const result: WriteKgEntitiesResult = { created: 0, updated: 0 };
return kg.runInTransaction(() => {
const result: WriteKgEntitiesResult = { created: 0, updated: 0 };
for (const entity of extraction.entities) {
// Defense at the write seam (mirrors the cognify CLI): callers other than
// extractKgEntities may not have noise-filtered.
if (isNoiseName(entity.name)) continue;
if (normalizeEntityName(entity.name).length < 3) continue;
for (const entity of extraction.entities) {
if (!entity || typeof entity !== 'object') continue;
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(entity.frameId) || entity.frameId <= 0) continue;
const name = typeof entity.name === 'string' ? entity.name.trim() : '';
if (isNoiseName(name)) continue;
if (normalizeEntityName(name).length < 3) continue;
if (!(KG_ENTITY_TYPES as readonly string[]).includes(entity.type)) continue;
if (evaluateExternalMemoryIngress({ content: name }).action !== 'allow') continue;
const existing = kg.findEntityByName(entity.name);
if (existing) {
const existingProps = safeParseProps(existing.properties);
const seenCount = Number(existingProps.seen_count ?? 1) + 1;
kg.updateEntity(existing.id, {
properties: { ...existingProps, seen_count: seenCount },
});
kg.linkEntityToFrame(existing.id, entity.frameId);
result.updated++;
} else {
try {
const created = kg.createEntity(entity.type, entity.name, { seen_count: 1, source: 'cognify-llm' });
kg.linkEntityToFrame(created.id, entity.frameId);
result.created++;
} catch (e: unknown) {
// Ontology validation may reject — skip this entity, never abort the pass.
log.warn('createEntity rejected extracted entity', {
name: entity.name,
error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
const existing = kg.findEntityByName(name);
if (existing) {
if (!kg.linkEntityToFrameStrict(existing.id, entity.frameId)) continue;
const existingProps = safeParseProps(existing.properties);
const previousSeenCount = Number(existingProps.seen_count ?? 1);
const seenCount = (Number.isFinite(previousSeenCount) && previousSeenCount >= 0
? previousSeenCount
: 1) + 1;
kg.updateEntity(existing.id, {
properties: { ...existingProps, seen_count: seenCount },
});
result.updated++;
} else {
let created: { id: number };
try {
created = kg.createEntity(entity.type, name, {
seen_count: 1,
source: 'cognify-llm',
});
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof Error && error.message.startsWith('Validation failed:')) {
log.warn('createEntity rejected extracted entity', {
name,
error: error.message,
});
continue;
}
throw error;
}
if (!kg.linkEntityToFrameStrict(created.id, entity.frameId)) {
throw new Error(`KG writer failed to link entity ${created.id} to frame ${entity.frameId}`);
}
result.created++;
}
}
}
return result;
return result;
});
}

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,10 @@ import type {
} from './types.js';
import { CLASSIFY_PROMPT, EXTRACT_PROMPT, SYNTHESIZE_PROMPT } from './prompts.js';
import { dedup } from './dedup.js';
import { scanForInjection } from '../injection-scanner.js';
import {
evaluateExternalMemoryIngress,
projectExternalMemoryContent,
} from '../memory-ingress-guard.js';
import { createCoreLogger } from '../logger.js';
const log = createCoreLogger('harvest-pipeline');
@@ -102,26 +105,34 @@ export class HarvestPipeline {
const errors: string[] = [];
log.info('harvest pipeline starting', { source, itemCount: items.length, batchSize: this.batchSize, concurrency: this.concurrency });
// Pass 0: Injection scan — drop any item whose title or content carries a
// prompt-injection payload (role_override / prompt_extraction / instruction_injection).
// Pass 0: Injection scan — drop any item whose untrusted title or message
// text carries a prompt-injection payload. Structured conversation adapters
// synthesize item.content with trusted `user:` / `assistant:` labels; scan
// their original message text instead so those labels are not mistaken for
// attacker-supplied authority markers. Unstructured items still scan their
// complete content. The exact-serialization check prevents a partial
// messages projection from hiding extra attacker-controlled content.
// Harvest ingests UNTRUSTED external exports (ChatGPT/Claude/Gemini JSON dumps,
// Perplexity shares, URL fetches). A hostile file must not flow through to the
// LLM passes or into memory frames.
const originalCount = items.length;
items = items.filter((item) => {
// Scan title + first 4KB of content — enough to catch payloads hidden in either field.
// Using 'tool_output' context since imports are external data, weighted like tool output.
const probe = `${item.title ?? ''}\n${(item.content ?? '').slice(0, 4000)}`;
const scan = scanForInjection(probe, 'tool_output');
if (!scan.safe) {
const reason = scan.flags.join(',');
const untrustedContent = projectExternalMemoryContent({
content: item.content ?? '',
messages: item.messages,
parseMethod: item.metadata?.parseMethod,
});
const decision = evaluateExternalMemoryIngress({
title: item.title,
content: untrustedContent,
});
if (decision.action === 'block') {
log.warn('dropping harvest item with injection payload', {
itemId: item.id,
title: item.title?.slice(0, 80),
flags: scan.flags,
score: scan.score,
itemId: String(item.id).slice(0, 80),
flags: decision.scan.flags,
score: decision.scan.score,
});
errors.push(`Blocked item "${item.title?.slice(0, 40) ?? item.id}" — injection detected (${reason})`);
errors.push('Blocked imported item due to unsafe content.');
return false;
}
return true;

View File

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
import type { FrameStore } from '../mind/frames.js';
import type { UniversalImportItem } from './types.js';
import { HARVEST_FRAME_CONTENT_CAP } from './types.js';
import { scanForInjection } from '../injection-scanner.js';
import { evaluateExternalMemoryIngress } from '../memory-ingress-guard.js';
import { createCoreLogger } from '../logger.js';
const log = createCoreLogger('raw-turns');
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ export const MIND_RAWTURN_PREFIX = '[mind-rawturn';
/** Hard per-conversation cap — backstop against pathological exports.
* LoCoMo conversations run ~600 turns; 2000 leaves generous headroom. */
export const MAX_TURNS_PER_ITEM = 2000;
const MAX_INJECTION_DROP_LOGS = 8;
/** Env kill switch (checked by CALLERS, mirrored here for the recall lane). */
export const RAWDETAIL_KILL_SWITCH = 'WAGGLE_RAWDETAIL';
@@ -127,31 +128,38 @@ export function writeRawTurnFrames(
const itemTs = isIsoTimestamp(item.timestamp) ? item.timestamp : undefined;
let turn = 0;
let inspected = 0;
let suppressedInjectionLogs = 0;
for (const msg of messages) {
if (msg.role !== 'user' && msg.role !== 'assistant') continue;
if (inspected >= MAX_TURNS_PER_ITEM) {
result.capped = true;
break;
}
inspected++;
const text = (msg.text ?? '').trim();
if (text.length === 0) {
result.skippedEmpty++;
continue;
}
if (turn >= MAX_TURNS_PER_ITEM) {
result.capped = true;
break;
}
// Scan first 4KB — same probe budget as the harvest pipeline's Pass 0.
const scan = scanForInjection(text.slice(0, 4000), 'tool_output');
if (!scan.safe) {
const storedText = text.slice(0, HARVEST_FRAME_CONTENT_CAP);
const decision = evaluateExternalMemoryIngress({ content: storedText });
if (decision.action === 'block') {
result.injectionDropped++;
log.warn('dropping raw turn with injection payload', {
conv: convKey, turn, flags: scan.flags.join(','),
});
if (result.injectionDropped <= MAX_INJECTION_DROP_LOGS) {
log.warn('dropping raw turn with injection payload', {
conv: convKey, turn, flags: decision.scan.flags,
});
} else {
suppressedInjectionLogs++;
}
continue;
}
const speaker = sanitizeToken(msg.role, 24);
const createdAt = isIsoTimestamp(msg.timestamp) ? msg.timestamp : itemTs;
frames.createIFrame(
gopId,
`${rawTurnHeader(convKey, turn, speaker)}\n${text.slice(0, HARVEST_FRAME_CONTENT_CAP)}`,
`${rawTurnHeader(convKey, turn, speaker)}\n${storedText}`,
'normal',
'import',
createdAt,
@@ -160,9 +168,14 @@ export function writeRawTurnFrames(
turn++;
}
if (suppressedInjectionLogs > 0) {
log.warn('additional raw-turn injection warnings suppressed', {
conv: convKey, suppressed: suppressedInjectionLogs,
});
}
if (result.capped) {
log.warn('raw-turn storage capped — conversation exceeds MAX_TURNS_PER_ITEM', {
conv: convKey, stored: result.written, totalMessages: messages.length,
conv: convKey, inspected, stored: result.written, totalMessages: messages.length,
});
}
return result;

View File

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
* internal services on the cloud/TEAMS deploy (sidecar binds 0.0.0.0) and can
* exfiltrate instance-metadata IAM credentials.
*
* This module is a self-contained, dependency-free (node builtins only) copy of
* the guard spec shared with `packages/agent/src/url-egress-guard.ts`. It lives
* This module is a self-contained copy of the guard spec shared with
* `packages/agent/src/url-egress-guard.ts`. It lives
* here — rather than importing from @waggle/agent — because hive-mind-core is
* OSS-mirrored and must not depend on Waggle-proprietary packages. Keep the two
* implementations in sync; they share one spec.
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
*/
import { lookup as dnsLookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
import { isIP } from 'node:net';
import { isIP, type LookupFunction } from 'node:net';
import { Agent } from 'undici';
export type AddressClass =
| 'public'
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ function classifyIpv4(ip: string): AddressClass {
if (a >= 240) return 'reserved'; // 240.0.0.0/4 + 255.255.255.255
if (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0) return 'reserved'; // 192.0.0.0/24
if (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 2) return 'reserved'; // TEST-NET-1
if (a === 192 && b === 88 && c === 99) return 'reserved'; // Deprecated 6to4 relay anycast
if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) return 'reserved'; // 198.18.0.0/15
if (a === 198 && b === 51 && c === 100) return 'reserved'; // TEST-NET-2
if (a === 203 && b === 0 && c === 113) return 'reserved'; // TEST-NET-3
@@ -142,11 +144,20 @@ function classifyIpv6(ip: string): AddressClass {
}
if ((h[0] & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80) return 'link-local'; // fe80::/10
if ((h[0] & 0xffc0) === 0xfec0) return 'reserved'; // fec0::/10 deprecated site-local
if ((h[0] & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00) return 'unique-local'; // fc00::/7 (ULA)
if ((h[0] & 0xff00) === 0xff00) return 'multicast'; // ff00::/8
if (h[0] === 0x2001 && h[1] === 0x0db8) return 'reserved'; // 2001:db8::/32 docs
if (h[0] === 0x0064 && h[1] === 0xff9b) return 'reserved'; // 64:ff9b::/96 NAT64
if (
h[0] === 0x0064 && h[1] === 0xff9b
&& ((h[2] === 0 && h[3] === 0 && h[4] === 0 && h[5] === 0) || h[2] === 1)
) return 'reserved'; // 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48 translation prefixes
if (h[0] === 0x0100 && h[1] === 0 && h[2] === 0 && h[3] === 0) return 'reserved'; // 100::/64 discard
if (h[0] === 0x0100 && h[1] === 0 && h[2] === 0 && h[3] === 1) return 'reserved'; // 100:0:0:1::/64 dummy
if (h[0] === 0x2001 && h[1] === 2 && h[2] === 0) return 'reserved'; // 2001:2::/48 benchmark
if (h[0] === 0x2002) return 'reserved'; // 2002::/16 deprecated 6to4
if (h[0] === 0x3fff && (h[1] & 0xf000) === 0) return 'reserved'; // 3fff::/20 docs
if (h[0] === 0x5f00) return 'reserved'; // 5f00::/16 SRv6 SIDs
return 'public';
}
@@ -169,6 +180,120 @@ async function defaultLookup(hostname: string): Promise<ResolvedAddress[]> {
return results.map((r) => ({ address: r.address, family: r.family }));
}
async function resolveHostname(
hostname: string,
rawUrl: string,
lookupFn: LookupFn,
): Promise<ResolvedAddress[]> {
try {
const addresses = await lookupFn(hostname);
if (!addresses || addresses.length === 0) {
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`DNS resolution returned no addresses for "${hostname}"`,
rawUrl,
);
}
return addresses;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof EgressBlockedError) throw err;
const detail = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`DNS resolution failed for "${hostname}": ${detail}`,
rawUrl,
);
}
}
function validateResolvedAddresses(
addresses: ResolvedAddress[],
hostname: string,
rawUrl: string,
allowLocal: boolean,
): void {
for (const { address } of addresses) {
const cls = classifyAddress(address);
if (!isAllowed(cls, allowLocal)) {
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`Blocked egress to ${cls} address ${address} (host "${hostname}")`,
rawUrl,
cls,
);
}
}
}
function createGuardedLookup(
allowLocal: boolean,
lookupFn: LookupFn,
): LookupFunction {
return (hostname, options, callback) => {
void resolveHostname(hostname, hostname, lookupFn)
.then((addresses) => {
validateResolvedAddresses(addresses, hostname, hostname, allowLocal);
const requestedFamily = options.family === 4 || options.family === 'IPv4'
? 4
: options.family === 6 || options.family === 'IPv6'
? 6
: 0;
const candidates = requestedFamily === 0
? addresses
: addresses.filter(({ family }) => family === requestedFamily);
if (candidates.length === 0) {
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`DNS resolution returned no IPv${requestedFamily} addresses for "${hostname}"`,
hostname,
);
}
if (options.all) {
callback(null, candidates);
} else {
const selected = candidates[0];
callback(null, selected.address, selected.family);
}
})
.catch((err: unknown) => {
callback(err as NodeJS.ErrnoException, '');
});
};
}
function createGuardedAgent(allowLocal: boolean, lookupFn: LookupFn): Agent {
return new Agent({
autoSelectFamily: true,
connect: { lookup: createGuardedLookup(allowLocal, lookupFn) },
});
}
const defaultGuardedAgents = new Map<boolean, Agent>();
function getDefaultGuardedAgent(allowLocal: boolean): Agent {
const existing = defaultGuardedAgents.get(allowLocal);
if (existing) return existing;
const agent = createGuardedAgent(allowLocal, defaultLookup);
defaultGuardedAgents.set(allowLocal, agent);
return agent;
}
function findEgressBlockedError(
error: unknown,
seen = new Set<unknown>(),
): EgressBlockedError | null {
if (error instanceof EgressBlockedError) return error;
if (typeof error !== 'object' || error === null || seen.has(error)) return null;
seen.add(error);
if (error instanceof AggregateError) {
for (const nested of error.errors) {
const blocked = findEgressBlockedError(nested, seen);
if (blocked) return blocked;
}
}
return findEgressBlockedError((error as { cause?: unknown }).cause, seen);
}
/**
* Validate that `rawUrl` is an http(s) URL whose host resolves only to public
* addresses. Throws {@link EgressBlockedError} otherwise. Returns parsed URL.
@@ -191,6 +316,10 @@ export async function assertUrlAllowed(
);
}
if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
throw new EgressBlockedError('Blocked URL credentials', rawUrl);
}
// url.hostname keeps the surrounding brackets on an IPv6 literal ("[::1]"),
// which isIP() does not recognize — strip them so the literal is classified
// directly (loopback/private/link-local/…) instead of falling through to a DNS
@@ -204,34 +333,11 @@ export async function assertUrlAllowed(
addresses = [{ address: hostname, family: literalFamily }];
} else {
const lookupFn = options.lookup ?? defaultLookup;
try {
addresses = await lookupFn(hostname);
} catch (err) {
const detail = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`DNS resolution failed for "${hostname}": ${detail}`,
rawUrl,
);
}
if (!addresses || addresses.length === 0) {
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`DNS resolution returned no addresses for "${hostname}"`,
rawUrl,
);
}
addresses = await resolveHostname(hostname, rawUrl, lookupFn);
}
const allowLocal = options.allowLocal ?? false;
for (const { address } of addresses) {
const cls = classifyAddress(address);
if (!isAllowed(cls, allowLocal)) {
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`Blocked egress to ${cls} address ${address} (host "${hostname}")`,
rawUrl,
cls,
);
}
}
validateResolvedAddresses(addresses, hostname, rawUrl, allowLocal);
return parsed;
}
@@ -239,29 +345,119 @@ export async function assertUrlAllowed(
export interface SafeFetchOptions extends EgressGuardOptions {
/** Maximum redirect hops to follow (default 5). */
maxRedirects?: number;
/** Injectable fetch (tests). Defaults to globalThis.fetch. */
fetchImpl?: typeof globalThis.fetch;
}
type FetchWithDispatcher = (
input: string | URL | Request,
init: RequestInit & { dispatcher: Agent },
) => Promise<Response>;
const REDIRECT_STATUSES = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308]);
const CROSS_ORIGIN_SECRET_HEADERS = [
'authorization',
'proxy-authorization',
'cookie',
'cookie2',
'x-api-key',
'api-key',
] as const;
const REQUEST_BODY_HEADERS = [
'content-encoding',
'content-language',
'content-length',
'content-location',
'content-type',
] as const;
function isNonReplayableBody(body: BodyInit): boolean {
const candidate = body as unknown as {
getReader?: unknown;
pipe?: unknown;
[Symbol.asyncIterator]?: unknown;
};
return typeof candidate.getReader === 'function'
|| typeof candidate.pipe === 'function'
|| typeof candidate[Symbol.asyncIterator] === 'function';
}
function redirectRequestInit(
init: RequestInit,
status: number,
fromUrl: URL,
toUrl: URL,
): RequestInit {
const next = { ...init };
const method = (next.method ?? 'GET').toUpperCase();
const rewriteToGet = ((status === 301 || status === 302) && method === 'POST')
|| (status === 303 && method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD');
const headersToDelete = new Set<string>(['host']);
if (rewriteToGet) {
next.method = 'GET';
delete next.body;
for (const name of REQUEST_BODY_HEADERS) headersToDelete.add(name);
} else if (next.body !== undefined && next.body !== null && isNonReplayableBody(next.body)) {
throw new TypeError('Cannot replay a streamed request body across a redirect');
}
if (fromUrl.origin !== toUrl.origin) {
for (const name of CROSS_ORIGIN_SECRET_HEADERS) headersToDelete.add(name);
}
const headers = new Headers(next.headers);
for (const name of headersToDelete) headers.delete(name);
next.headers = headers;
return next;
}
/**
* SSRF-safe fetch. Validates before the request and re-validates every redirect
* hop (`redirect: 'manual'`). Caller-supplied `redirect` in `init` is ignored.
* hop (`redirect: 'manual'`). Native fetch is mandatory; proxy transports need
* an equivalent pinned connector rather than a global dispatcher override.
* Caller-supplied `redirect` in `init` is ignored.
*/
export async function safeFetch(
rawUrl: string,
init: RequestInit = {},
options: SafeFetchOptions = {},
): Promise<Response> {
if ('fetchImpl' in options) {
throw new TypeError('safeFetch fetchImpl injection is not supported; socket pinning requires native fetch');
}
const maxRedirects = options.maxRedirects ?? 5;
const fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? globalThis.fetch;
let currentUrl = rawUrl;
let currentInit = { ...init };
for (let hop = 0; hop <= maxRedirects; hop++) {
await assertUrlAllowed(currentUrl, options);
const allowLocal = options.allowLocal ?? false;
const temporaryAgent = options.lookup !== undefined;
const dispatcher = temporaryAgent
? createGuardedAgent(allowLocal, options.lookup!)
: getDefaultGuardedAgent(allowLocal);
const response = await fetchImpl(currentUrl, { ...init, redirect: 'manual' });
let response: Response;
try {
response = await (globalThis.fetch as unknown as FetchWithDispatcher)(currentUrl, {
...currentInit,
redirect: 'manual',
dispatcher,
});
} catch (err) {
if (temporaryAgent) {
await dispatcher.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
const blocked = findEgressBlockedError(err);
if (blocked) {
throw new EgressBlockedError(blocked.message, currentUrl, blocked.addressClass);
}
throw err;
}
const isRedirect = response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400;
if (temporaryAgent) {
void dispatcher.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
const isRedirect = REDIRECT_STATUSES.has(response.status);
const location = isRedirect ? response.headers.get('location') : null;
if (!location) {
return response;
@@ -273,16 +469,22 @@ export async function safeFetch(
/* best-effort; ignore */
}
let nextUrl: string;
let nextUrl: URL;
try {
nextUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).toString();
nextUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl);
} catch {
throw new EgressBlockedError(
`Invalid redirect target "${location}"`,
currentUrl,
);
}
currentUrl = nextUrl;
currentInit = redirectRequestInit(
currentInit,
response.status,
new URL(currentUrl),
nextUrl,
);
currentUrl = nextUrl.toString();
}
throw new EgressBlockedError(