moving
This commit is contained in:
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ export interface McpToolRetrievalSettings {
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const DEFAULT_MODEL = 'claude-sonnet-4-6';
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function getNonBlankEnv(name: string): string | undefined {
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return process.env[name]?.trim() || undefined;
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}
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function getDefaultConfigDir(): string {
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const home = process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || os.homedir();
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return path.join(home, '.waggle');
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@@ -247,15 +251,15 @@ export class WaggleConfig {
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getEmbeddingConfig(): EmbeddingProviderConfig {
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const emb = this.data.embedding;
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const config: EmbeddingProviderConfig = {
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provider: (process.env.EMBEDDING_PROVIDER as EmbeddingProviderType | 'auto' | undefined) ?? emb?.provider ?? 'auto',
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provider: (getNonBlankEnv('EMBEDDING_PROVIDER') as EmbeddingProviderType | 'auto' | undefined) ?? emb?.provider ?? 'auto',
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targetDimensions: 1024,
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inprocess: {
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model: process.env.EMBEDDING_MODEL ?? emb?.inprocessModel,
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model: getNonBlankEnv('EMBEDDING_MODEL') ?? emb?.inprocessModel,
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cacheDir: path.join(this.configDir, 'models'),
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},
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ollama: {
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baseUrl: process.env.OLLAMA_HOST ?? emb?.ollamaUrl,
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model: process.env.OLLAMA_EMBED_MODEL ?? emb?.ollamaModel,
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baseUrl: getNonBlankEnv('OLLAMA_HOST') ?? emb?.ollamaUrl,
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model: getNonBlankEnv('OLLAMA_EMBED_MODEL') ?? emb?.ollamaModel,
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},
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// API keys injected separately from Vault — not stored in config.json
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};
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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import path from 'node:path';
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import type { MindDB } from '@waggle/hive-mind-core';
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import { FrameStore } from '@waggle/hive-mind-core';
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import { evaluateExternalMemoryIngress, FrameStore } from '@waggle/hive-mind-core';
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import { SessionStore } from '@waggle/hive-mind-core';
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const FILE_INDEX_TABLE_SQL = `
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@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export interface FileIndexRow {
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}
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export type FileIndexResult =
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| { skipped: true; reason: 'unsupported_format' | 'unchanged' | 'empty' }
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| { skipped: true; reason: 'unsupported_format' | 'unchanged' | 'empty' | 'unsafe_content' }
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| { skipped: false; frameId: number; truncated: boolean };
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export class FileIndexer {
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@@ -121,13 +121,21 @@ export class FileIndexer {
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| Record<string, unknown>
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| undefined;
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if (existingRow && existingRow.content_hash === hash) {
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return { skipped: true, reason: 'unchanged' };
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}
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const normalized = this.normalizeText(content);
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const truncated = content.length > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES;
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const frameBody = this.buildFrameContent(filePath, normalized, truncated, mime);
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if (evaluateExternalMemoryIngress({ content: frameBody }).action === 'block') {
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// An unchanged row may pre-date this guard. Remove that already-indexed
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// unsafe projection atomically; on a new unsafe overwrite, retain the
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// prior benign index while the file write itself remains successful.
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if (existingRow && existingRow.content_hash === hash) {
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raw.transaction(() => this.removeFile(filePath))();
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}
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return { skipped: true, reason: 'unsafe_content' };
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}
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if (existingRow && existingRow.content_hash === hash) {
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return { skipped: true, reason: 'unchanged' };
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}
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const gopId = this.ensureSession();
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// Atomicity contract (L-20 BLOCKER-1 fix): createIFrame → (conditional
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// old-frame delete) → UPDATE/INSERT on file_index must commit as one unit.
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@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@
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//
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// As of CC Sesija B 2026-04-30 (PM Q3 Plan A ratification), the substrate
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// (mind/ + harvest/ + logger + injection-scanner) lives in @waggle/hive-mind-core
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// and is distributed as Apache 2.0 OSS via subtree-split. This barrel re-exports
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// and is distributed as Apache 2.0 OSS through a reviewed, maintainer-curated
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// forward-port. Raw subtree-split output is never a publication source. This
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// barrel re-exports
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// substrate symbols for backward compatibility — existing consumers (packages/agent,
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// apps/web, packages/server, etc.) keep their `import { ... } from '@waggle/core'`
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// imports unchanged.
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@@ -17,6 +19,9 @@ export {
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// Logger + injection scanner
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createCoreLogger, type CoreLogger,
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scanForInjection, type ScanResult,
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evaluateExternalMemoryIngress, projectExternalMemoryContent,
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type ExternalMemoryIngressDecision, type ExternalMemoryIngressInput,
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type ExternalMemoryProjectionInput,
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// mind/ — memory substrate
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MindDB, EmbeddingDimMismatchError,
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type EmbeddingFingerprint, type FingerprintCheck,
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@@ -144,7 +149,7 @@ export {
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type OptimizationLogEntry, type CreateOptimizationLogInput,
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} from './optimization-log.js';
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// ── Compliance (AI Act) — stays in @waggle/core (NOT extracted per .github/sync.md) ──
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// ── Compliance (AI Act) — stays in @waggle/core; excluded by curated export ──
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export { InteractionStore } from './compliance/interaction-store.js';
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export { ComplianceStatusChecker } from './compliance/status-checker.js';
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export { ReportGenerator, type ReportGeneratorDeps } from './compliance/report-generator.js';
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@@ -63,9 +63,10 @@ export interface RecordAuditInput {
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// P7/D15 A3: the CHECK lists are generated from the canonical @waggle/shared
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// arrays via sqlInList, so the SQLite constraint and the TS union can no longer
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// drift (divergence #14 — the old comment admitted "drift silently crashes
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// record()"). The mirror DDL in hive-mind-core/src/mind/schema.ts stays a
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// standalone literal (it's the OSS substrate, §7.5) but is locked to these same
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// canonical lists by the parity test in install-audit-check-parity.test.ts.
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// record()"). The matching DDL in hive-mind-core/src/mind/schema.ts stays a
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// standalone private-monorepo literal and is locked to these same canonical
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// lists by install-audit-check-parity.test.ts. It is stripped from the curated
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// OSS export.
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// P7/D15 #15: trust_source now also carries a CHECK (was unconstrained at the DB
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// while the TS type claimed a closed set). Every historical value came from the
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// typed AuditTrustSource (the pre-security-gate 6-set ⊂ the current 7-set), so
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@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ export interface TeamSyncConfig {
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displayName: string;
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}
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export type TeamSyncFetch = (url: string, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
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export interface SyncedFrame {
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/** Server-side entity ID (UUID). */
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remoteId: string;
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@@ -88,10 +90,12 @@ export function entityToSyncedFrame(entity: {
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*/
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export class TeamSync {
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private config: TeamSyncConfig;
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private fetchTeamServer: TeamSyncFetch;
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private lastSyncTimestamp: string | null = null;
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constructor(config: TeamSyncConfig) {
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constructor(config: TeamSyncConfig, fetchTeamServer: TeamSyncFetch) {
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this.config = config;
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this.fetchTeamServer = fetchTeamServer;
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}
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/**
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@@ -102,7 +106,7 @@ export class TeamSync {
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const entity = frameToEntity(frame, this.config.userId, this.config.displayName);
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try {
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const response = await fetch(
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const response = await this.fetchTeamServer(
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`${this.config.teamServerUrl}/api/teams/${this.config.teamSlug}/entities`,
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{
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method: 'POST',
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@@ -137,7 +141,7 @@ export class TeamSync {
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const url = `${this.config.teamServerUrl}/api/teams/${this.config.teamSlug}/entities?type=memory_frame`;
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// Note: `since` filtering would require server-side support. For now, pull all and filter client-side.
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const response = await fetch(url, {
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const response = await this.fetchTeamServer(url, {
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headers: {
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'Authorization': `Bearer ${this.config.authToken}`,
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},
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@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ interface VaultRecord {
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updatedAt: string;
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}
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interface ConnectorCredentialInput {
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type: 'api_key' | 'oauth2' | 'bearer' | 'basic';
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value: string;
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refreshToken?: string;
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expiresAt?: string;
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scopes?: string[];
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}
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export class VaultStore {
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private dataDir: string;
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private vaultPath: string;
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@@ -52,41 +60,118 @@ export class VaultStore {
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/** Ensure the encryption key exists. Generate if missing. */
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private ensureKey(): Buffer {
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let key: Buffer;
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let created = false;
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if (fs.existsSync(this.keyPath)) {
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const key = Buffer.from(fs.readFileSync(this.keyPath, 'utf-8').trim(), 'hex');
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const keyStat = fs.lstatSync(this.keyPath);
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if (!keyStat.isFile() || keyStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
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throw new Error(`Vault key path is not a regular file: ${this.keyPath}`);
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}
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key = Buffer.from(fs.readFileSync(this.keyPath, 'utf-8').trim(), 'hex');
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if (key.length !== KEY_LENGTH) {
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throw new Error(
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`Vault key file is corrupted — expected ${KEY_LENGTH} bytes, got ${key.length}. Delete ${this.keyPath} to regenerate.`
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);
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}
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return key;
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} else {
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key = crypto.randomBytes(KEY_LENGTH);
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
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fs.writeFileSync(this.keyPath, key.toString('hex'), { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' });
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}
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created = true;
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}
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const key = crypto.randomBytes(KEY_LENGTH);
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fs.writeFileSync(this.keyPath, key.toString('hex'), { mode: 0o600 });
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// Review Critical #1: On Windows, restrict key file access to current user only.
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// Previously used `require('node:child_process')` inline which fails silently under
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// ESM (`type: module` in the sidecar) — the try/catch swallowed the ReferenceError
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// and every Windows install left the vault key with no ACL restriction.
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// Now imported statically at the top of the file; the try/catch only covers actual
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// icacls failures (e.g. icacls.exe not on PATH in a minimal Windows image).
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if (process.platform === 'win32') {
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try {
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// Resolve the current user via whoami (safer than process.env.USERNAME
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// which can be absent or spoofed in containerized/scripted setups)
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const currentUser = execFileSync('whoami', { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim();
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execFileSync('icacls', [
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this.keyPath,
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'/inheritance:r',
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'/grant:r',
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`${currentUser}:F`,
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], { stdio: 'ignore' });
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this.restrictWindowsKeyPermissions(created ? key : undefined);
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} catch (err) {
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log.warn('Could not restrict key file permissions via icacls — vault key may be readable by other users', err);
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const reason = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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throw new Error(`Could not restrict vault key permissions on Windows: ${reason}.`);
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}
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}
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return key;
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}
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private restrictWindowsKeyPermissions(newKey?: Buffer): void {
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const systemRoot = process.env.SystemRoot?.trim();
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const normalizedRoot = systemRoot ? path.win32.normalize(systemRoot) : '';
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if (!/^[A-Za-z]:\\/.test(normalizedRoot)) {
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throw new Error('SystemRoot is missing or is not a drive-rooted Windows path');
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}
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const system32 = path.win32.join(normalizedRoot, 'System32');
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const powershell = path.win32.join(
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system32,
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'WindowsPowerShell',
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'v1.0',
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'powershell.exe',
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);
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const aclScript = [
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"$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
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'$keyPath = $env:WAGGLE_VAULT_KEY_PATH',
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'$createKey = $env:WAGGLE_VAULT_CREATE_KEY -eq "1"',
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'$createdByThisInvocation = $false',
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'try {',
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' $sid = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User',
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' $full = [Security.AccessControl.FileSystemRights]::FullControl',
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' $allow = [Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow',
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' $targetAcl = New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSecurity',
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' $targetAcl.SetOwner($sid)',
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' $targetAcl.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)',
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' $targetAcl.AddAccessRule((New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule -ArgumentList @($sid, $full, $allow)))',
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' if ($createKey) {',
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' $keyHex = [Console]::In.ReadToEnd().Trim()',
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' if ($keyHex -notmatch "^[0-9a-f]{64}$") { throw "Invalid generated vault key" }',
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' $keyBytes = [Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes($keyHex)',
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' $stream = [IO.FileStream]::new($keyPath, [IO.FileMode]::CreateNew, $full, [IO.FileShare]::None, 4096, [IO.FileOptions]::WriteThrough, $targetAcl)',
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' $createdByThisInvocation = $true',
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' try { $stream.Write($keyBytes, 0, $keyBytes.Length); $stream.Flush($true) } finally { $stream.Dispose() }',
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' } else {',
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' $existingAttributes = [IO.File]::GetAttributes($keyPath)',
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' if (($existingAttributes -band [IO.FileAttributes]::Directory) -or ($existingAttributes -band [IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint)) { throw "Vault key is not a regular file" }',
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' [IO.File]::SetAccessControl($keyPath, $targetAcl)',
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' }',
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' $attributes = [IO.File]::GetAttributes($keyPath)',
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' $length = [IO.FileInfo]::new($keyPath).Length',
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' if (($attributes -band [IO.FileAttributes]::Directory) -or ($attributes -band [IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint) -or $length -ne 64) { throw "Vault key payload is not a regular 64-byte file" }',
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' $acl = [IO.File]::GetAccessControl($keyPath)',
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' $ownerSid = $acl.GetOwner([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])',
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' $rules = @($acl.GetAccessRules($true, $true, [Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]))',
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' $current = @($rules | Where-Object { -not $_.IsInherited -and $_.IdentityReference.Value -eq $sid.Value -and $_.AccessControlType -eq [Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow })',
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' $hasFull = @($current | Where-Object { ($_.FileSystemRights -band $full) -eq $full }).Count -eq 1',
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' if (-not $acl.AreAccessRulesProtected -or $ownerSid.Value -ne $sid.Value -or $rules.Count -ne 1 -or -not $hasFull) { throw "Vault ACL is not current-user-only" }',
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'} catch {',
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' if ($createdByThisInvocation) { try { [IO.File]::Delete($keyPath) } catch {} }',
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' throw',
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'}',
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].join('\n');
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const childEnv: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {
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SystemRoot: normalizedRoot,
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WINDIR: normalizedRoot,
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WAGGLE_VAULT_KEY_PATH: this.keyPath,
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WAGGLE_VAULT_CREATE_KEY: newKey ? '1' : '0',
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};
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for (const name of ['TEMP', 'TMP', 'ComSpec', 'SystemDrive', 'PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE']) {
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const value = process.env[name];
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if (value) childEnv[name] = value;
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}
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execFileSync(powershell, [
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'-NoLogo',
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'-NoProfile',
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'-NonInteractive',
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'-EncodedCommand',
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Buffer.from(aclScript, 'utf16le').toString('base64'),
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], {
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encoding: 'utf-8',
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env: childEnv,
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input: newKey?.toString('hex') ?? '',
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stdio: ['pipe', 'ignore', 'pipe'],
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windowsHide: true,
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});
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}
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/** Encrypt a plaintext string. Returns iv:authTag:ciphertext (all hex). */
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private encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
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const iv = crypto.randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
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@@ -233,26 +318,55 @@ export class VaultStore {
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return name in vault;
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}
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/** Set a connector credential with typed metadata */
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setConnectorCredential(connectorId: string, credential: {
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type: 'api_key' | 'oauth2' | 'bearer' | 'basic';
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value: string;
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refreshToken?: string;
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expiresAt?: string;
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scopes?: string[];
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}): void {
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this.set(`connector:${connectorId}`, credential.value, {
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credentialType: credential.type,
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expiresAt: credential.expiresAt,
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scopes: credential.scopes,
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});
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// Store refresh token as a separate encrypted entry (never in plaintext metadata)
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if (credential.refreshToken) {
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this.set(`connector:${connectorId}:refresh`, credential.refreshToken);
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} else {
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// Clear any previously stored refresh token if not provided
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this.delete(`connector:${connectorId}:refresh`);
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/** Set a connector credential with typed metadata. */
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setConnectorCredential(connectorId: string, credential: ConnectorCredentialInput): void {
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this.setConnectorCredentialBundle(connectorId, credential);
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}
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/**
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* Persist a connector credential and its encrypted companion values with one
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* vault-file replacement. This prevents a multi-field credential (for
|
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* example Jira token + email + site origin) from being partially updated.
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*/
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setConnectorCredentialBundle(
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connectorId: string,
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credential: ConnectorCredentialInput,
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relatedSecrets: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {},
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): void {
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const secretEntries = Object.entries(relatedSecrets);
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if (secretEntries.some(([suffix]) => !/^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$/.test(suffix))) {
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throw new TypeError('Invalid connector credential suffix');
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}
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const vault = this.readVault();
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const updatedAt = new Date().toISOString();
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vault[`connector:${connectorId}`] = {
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encrypted: this.encrypt(credential.value),
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metadata: {
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credentialType: credential.type,
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expiresAt: credential.expiresAt,
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scopes: credential.scopes,
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},
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updatedAt,
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};
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const refreshKey = `connector:${connectorId}:refresh`;
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if (credential.refreshToken) {
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vault[refreshKey] = {
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encrypted: this.encrypt(credential.refreshToken),
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updatedAt,
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};
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} else {
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delete vault[refreshKey];
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}
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for (const [suffix, value] of secretEntries) {
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vault[`connector:${connectorId}:${suffix}`] = {
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encrypted: this.encrypt(value),
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updatedAt,
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};
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}
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this.writeVault(vault);
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}
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/** Get a connector credential with typed metadata */
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|
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user