moving
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@@ -10,34 +10,46 @@
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* 2. onToolUse callback
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* 3. Governance.blockedTools — early return on block (fires onToolResult)
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* 4. pre:tool hook — early return on cancel
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* 4b. critical-destructive hard floor — deny isCriticalNeverAutopass ops that
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* reach here without an approval gate (defense-in-depth; independent of hooks)
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* 4b. state-change approval floor — deny confirmation-required ops that reach
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* here without explicit authorization (defense-in-depth; independent of hooks)
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* 5. pre:memory-write hook (save_memory only) — early return on cancel
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* 6. LoopGuard.check — produces error result if duplicate
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* 7. Execute (or capability-router fallback or unknown-tool error)
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* 8. scanForInjection — REVIEW C2: BEFORE onToolResult / post-hooks
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* 8. evaluateExternalMemoryIngress — REVIEW C2: BEFORE onToolResult / post-hooks
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* 9. onToolResult callback (sanitized content)
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* 10. post:memory-write hook (save_memory only, sanitized)
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* 11. post:tool hook (sanitized)
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* 12. compress model-facing result (subtractive; observers keep full fidelity)
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*
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* Critical invariant (Review C2): steps 8 → 9 → 10 → 11 must stay in this
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* order. Sanitization output is what flows into both model context AND
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* order. Canonically guarded output is what flows into both model context AND
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* every downstream observer (audit / telemetry / team-sync / UI). Step 12 is
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* subtractive-only and applies ONLY to the returned (model-facing) content —
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* observers at 9–11 still receive the full sanitized result.
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* observers at 9–11 still receive the full guarded result.
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*/
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import type { ToolDefinition } from './tools.js';
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import type { HookRegistry } from './hooks.js';
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import type { CapabilityRouter } from './capability-router.js';
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import type { LoopGuard } from './loop-guard.js';
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import { scanForInjection } from './injection-scanner.js';
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import { isCriticalNeverAutopass } from './confirmation.js';
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import { evaluateExternalMemoryIngress } from '@waggle/core';
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import { isCriticalNeverAutopass, needsConfirmation } from './confirmation.js';
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import { compressToolOutput } from './tool-output-compressor.js';
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import { logTurnEvent } from './turn-context.js';
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import { untrustedContextWrapper } from './untrusted-context.js';
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const QUARANTINED_TOOL_OUTPUT = '[SECURITY] Tool output quarantined.';
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/**
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* Never reflect rejected external content (or guard details) beyond this boundary.
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* The canonical ingress guard includes legacy scanning plus normalization-aware checks.
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*/
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function guardExternalToolOutput(result: string): string {
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return evaluateExternalMemoryIngress({ content: result }).action === 'allow'
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? result
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: QUARANTINED_TOOL_OUTPUT;
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}
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export interface ToolExecutorDeps {
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toolMap: ReadonlyMap<string, ToolDefinition>;
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guard: LoopGuard;
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@@ -135,17 +147,19 @@ export async function executeToolCall(
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result = `Error: Unknown tool "${fnName}". Available tools: ${Array.from(toolMap.keys()).join(', ')}`;
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}
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const scanResult = scanForInjection(result, 'tool_output');
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if (!scanResult.safe) {
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result = `[SECURITY] Tool output flagged (${scanResult.flags.join(', ')}). Content sanitized.`;
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}
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result = guardExternalToolOutput(result);
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if (onToolResult) onToolResult(fnName, fnArgs, result);
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return { content: result, toolCallId: toolCall.id, countedAsUsed: false, toolName: fnName };
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}
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// ── Step 4: pre:tool hook ──
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let approvedByHook = false;
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if (hooks) {
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const hookResult = await hooks.fire('pre:tool', { toolName: fnName, args: fnArgs });
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const hookResult = await hooks.fire('pre:tool', {
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toolName: fnName,
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args: fnArgs,
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riskLevel: existingTool.riskLevel,
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});
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if (hookResult.cancelled) {
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return {
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content: `[BLOCKED] ${hookResult.reason ?? 'No reason given'}`,
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@@ -154,33 +168,33 @@ export async function executeToolCall(
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toolName: fnName,
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};
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}
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approvedByHook = hookResult.authorized === true;
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}
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// ── Step 4b: critical-destructive hard floor (defense-in-depth) ──
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// isCriticalNeverAutopass flags terminal, irreversible operations that must
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// pass a human/policy approval gate at EVERY layer — not only the main chat
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// loop. The main loop gates them via the pre:tool hook fired above; spawn
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// paths (sub-agent / workflow / worker) that forward that same hook registry
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// inherit the gate. If NO approval mechanism reached this call, fail closed:
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// deny rather than silently execute. This runs unconditionally — it does not
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// depend on the pre:tool hook being wired, which is the whole point. Without
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// it, a spawn path constructed with `hooks: undefined` executed rm -rf ~,
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// sudo, git push --force main, delete_skill, etc. unconfirmed.
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if (isCriticalNeverAutopass(fnName, fnArgs)) {
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// ── Step 4b: state-change approval floor (defense-in-depth) ──
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// Every confirmation-required operation must carry an explicit authorization
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// across this final execution boundary. Interactive chat supplies it through
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// its request-local pre:tool hook; saved grants and elevated autonomy do the
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// same after their policy checks. Background paths without an approval
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// provider therefore fail closed instead of silently mutating state.
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const critical = isCriticalNeverAutopass(fnName, fnArgs, existingTool.riskLevel);
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if (critical || needsConfirmation(fnName, fnArgs, existingTool.riskLevel)) {
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const approvedOutOfBand = confirmCriticalAction
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&& critical
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? await confirmCriticalAction(fnName, fnArgs)
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: false;
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// A pre:tool approval gate present at step 4 already vetted this call (a
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// critical op always trips needsConfirmationWithAutonomy, so reaching here
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// past a non-cancelled hook means it was approved). No callback and no gate
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// ⇒ no human in the loop ⇒ deny.
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const gatedByHook = hooks !== undefined;
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if (!approvedOutOfBand && !gatedByHook) {
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const denyMsg =
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`[BLOCKED] "${fnName}" is a critical, irreversible operation that requires ` +
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`explicit human approval. It was denied because this execution context ` +
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`(such as a sub-agent or automated workflow) has no approval gate. ` +
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`Terminal-destructive commands never run unconfirmed.`;
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// Only an explicit successful hook authorization or approval callback can
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// cross the hard floor. Registry presence or a swallowed hook error is not
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// proof that a human or policy gate approved the call.
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if (!approvedOutOfBand && !approvedByHook) {
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const denyMsg = critical
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? `[BLOCKED] "${fnName}" is a critical, irreversible operation that requires ` +
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`explicit human approval. It was denied because this execution context ` +
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`(such as a sub-agent or automated workflow) has no approval gate. ` +
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`Terminal-destructive commands never run unconfirmed.`
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: `[BLOCKED] "${fnName}" changes state and requires explicit approval. ` +
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`It was denied because this execution context (such as a sub-agent or ` +
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`automated workflow) did not provide an authorization decision.`;
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if (onToolResult) onToolResult(fnName, fnArgs, denyMsg);
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return { content: denyMsg, toolCallId: toolCall.id, countedAsUsed: false, toolName: fnName };
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}
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@@ -234,16 +248,17 @@ export async function executeToolCall(
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} else if (tool) {
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logTurnEvent(turnId, { stage: 'agent-loop.tool.enter', toolName: fnName, argsKeys: Object.keys(fnArgs) });
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try {
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result = await tool.execute(fnArgs);
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const rawResult = await tool.execute(fnArgs);
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// Tools in this codebase report many failures by RETURNING an
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// "Error: ..." string rather than throwing — count those as failures
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// too, or the failure tiers never see them.
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guard.record(fnName, fnArgs, !/^Error\b/.test(result));
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guard.record(fnName, fnArgs, !/^Error\b/.test(rawResult));
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result = guardExternalToolOutput(rawResult);
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logTurnEvent(turnId, { stage: 'agent-loop.tool.exit', toolName: fnName, resultChars: result.length, error: false });
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} catch (err) {
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result = `Error executing ${fnName}: ${(err as Error).message}`;
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result = guardExternalToolOutput(`Error executing ${fnName}: ${(err as Error).message}`);
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guard.record(fnName, fnArgs, false);
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logTurnEvent(turnId, { stage: 'agent-loop.tool.exit', toolName: fnName, error: true, errorMessage: (err as Error).message });
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logTurnEvent(turnId, { stage: 'agent-loop.tool.exit', toolName: fnName, error: true, errorMessage: result });
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}
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countedAsUsed = true;
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} else if (capabilityRouter) {
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@@ -261,16 +276,14 @@ export async function executeToolCall(
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result = `Error: Unknown tool "${fnName}". Available tools: ${Array.from(toolMap.keys()).join(', ')}`;
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}
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// ── Step 8: sanitize BEFORE post-hooks + onToolResult (Review C2) ──
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// The scanner output is what flows into both model context on the next
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// turn AND into every downstream observer (audit sinks, telemetry,
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// team-sync, UI). Order is load-bearing — do not reorder.
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const scanResult = scanForInjection(result, 'tool_output');
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if (!scanResult.safe) {
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result = `[SECURITY] Tool output flagged (${scanResult.flags.join(', ')}). Content sanitized.`;
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}
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// ── Step 8: canonical guard BEFORE post-hooks + onToolResult (Review C2) ──
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// The guarded output is what flows into both model context on the next turn
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// AND every downstream observer (audit sinks, telemetry, team-sync, UI).
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// Non-allows become an opaque marker; guard details and normalized attacker
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// content must never cross this boundary. Order is load-bearing.
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result = guardExternalToolOutput(result);
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// ── Step 9: onToolResult callback (sanitized content) ──
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// ── Step 9: onToolResult callback (guarded content) ──
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if (onToolResult) onToolResult(fnName, fnArgs, result);
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// ── Step 10: post:memory-write hook (save_memory only, sanitized) ──
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