docs: use project contacts in SECURITY.md and the code of conduct (P2.4)

Drop the personal email address. Security reports go through GitHub
private vulnerability reporting, with hello@egzakta.com as the fallback;
the code of conduct points security reports there too. Add a
supported-versions table for the first community release and update
the scope to the desktop app, the server installer and the shipped
packages.
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All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the
reporter of any incident.
Security vulnerabilities are not conduct issues. Report them privately as
described in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md): through GitHub private vulnerability
reporting, or to **hello@egzakta.com** if you cannot use GitHub.
## Enforcement Guidelines
Community leaders will follow these Community Impact Guidelines in determining

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# Security Policy
Waggle OS runs on a user's own machine and touches sensitive material — API
keys, connector credentials, the local filesystem, and imported conversation
history. We take reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.
Waggle runs on the user's own computer and handles sensitive material: provider API keys,
connector credentials, the local file system, chats and memories. We take reports seriously
and appreciate responsible disclosure.
For the trust boundary, the controls that enforce it, and the currently known
gaps, read [`THREAT_MODEL.md`](./THREAT_MODEL.md). It is the authoritative
description of what Waggle defends against and what it does not.
[`THREAT_MODEL.md`](./THREAT_MODEL.md) describes the trust boundary, the controls that enforce
it and the known gaps.
## Reporting a Vulnerability
## Supported versions
**Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.**
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| The latest community edition release | Yes |
| Earlier community edition releases | No. Update to the latest release. |
| Unreleased code on the default branch | Best effort |
Report privately through either channel:
The commercial Waggle OS product is not covered by this policy.
1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred).** On the repository, go to the
**Security** tab → **Report a vulnerability**. This opens a private advisory
visible only to the maintainers.
2. **Email.** Send details to **marko@egzakta.com** with `SECURITY` in the
## Reporting a vulnerability
**Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.**
1. **GitHub private vulnerability reporting (preferred).** On the repository, open the
**Security** tab and choose **Report a vulnerability**. The report is visible only to the
maintainers.
2. **Email, if you cannot use GitHub.** Write to **hello@egzakta.com** with `SECURITY` in the
subject line.
Please include:
- A description of the issue and the impact you believe it has.
- Step-by-step reproduction instructions (or a proof of concept).
- The affected component/package and version or commit SHA.
- Your environment (OS, Node version, desktop build vs. web).
- what the issue is and the impact you expect;
- steps to reproduce it, or a proof of concept;
- the affected component and the version or commit;
- your environment: operating system, desktop app or server installer, and the model provider
if it matters.
## What to Expect
## What to expect
- **Acknowledgement** within 5 business days.
- An initial assessment and severity classification shortly after.
- Coordinated disclosure: we will agree on a timeline with you and credit you in
the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
- An acknowledgement within 5 business days.
- An assessment and a severity rating after that.
- Coordinated disclosure: we agree on a timeline with you and credit you in the release notes
unless you prefer to stay anonymous.
Please give us a reasonable window to release a fix before any public
disclosure.
Please give us reasonable time to release a fix before you disclose the issue publicly.
## Scope
In scope:
- The desktop app (Tauri shell + bundled sidecar), the web app, and the
workspace packages under `packages/` and `apps/`.
- Memory (`packages/memory-contract`, `packages/memory-mem0`).
- Prompt-injection paths, secret handling (the vault), the filesystem boundary,
and the capability/approval gates — see `THREAT_MODEL.md` for the details.
- the desktop app (the Tauri shell and its bundled server);
- the server installer (`packages/launcher`) and the server archives it installs;
- the web UI (`apps/web`) and the shipped packages under `packages/`;
- memory (`packages/memory-contract`, `packages/memory-mem0`);
- prompt-injection paths, secret handling in the vault, the file-system boundary, the local
API's authentication, and the approval gates.
Out of scope (documented, not vulnerabilities):
Out of scope:
- The known gaps enumerated in `THREAT_MODEL.md` (e.g. the pattern-based
injection scanner and the absence of an OS-level shell sandbox). If you can
demonstrate impact meaningfully beyond what is already documented there, we
still want to hear about it.
- Findings that require a compromised operator account or physical access to the
user's machine — the operator is trusted by design.
- the known gaps listed in `THREAT_MODEL.md`, such as the pattern-based injection scanner and
the absence of an operating-system sandbox for shell commands. If you can show impact beyond
what is documented there, we still want to hear about it;
- findings that need control of the user's account or physical access to the computer: the user
is trusted by design;
- team mode packages (`packages/team-server`, `packages/waggle-dance`, `packages/worker`), which
are not built or shipped in this edition;
- third-party services that Waggle connects to.
## Secrets
If a report involves an exposed secret (an API key, token, or credential), note
it explicitly so we can rotate it immediately. Never include live secrets in a
public issue or PR.
If a report involves an exposed secret (an API key, a token or a credential), say so clearly so
it can be rotated at once. Never put live secrets in a public issue or pull request.