docs: drop references to the removed packages (P2.2)

AGENTS.md records that the excluded packages left in P2.2. SECURITY.md
scopes memory to memory-contract and memory-mem0. THREAT_MODEL.md points
the injection scanner at @waggle/core, marks the MCP tool scope gate as
removed with the memory MCP servers, and drops the hive-mind copy of the
URL egress guard. docs/ARCHITECTURE.md lists the memory packages instead
of the hive-mind substrate. docs/methodology.md, the LoCoMo write-up of
the hive-mind engine whose reproduction steps pointed at the
maintainer's hive-mind repository, is removed.
This commit is contained in:
shumeiko.it
2026-11-01 00:50:06 +01:00
parent 9276723f25
commit 72a2a895a5
5 changed files with 21 additions and 313 deletions

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ override, prompt-extraction) and make it act against the operator's intent.
## Controls (implemented)
### 1. Injection scanning at every ingress — `scanForInjection`
`packages/hive-mind-core/src/injection-scanner.ts` (re-exported via
`packages/core/src/injection-scanner.ts` (re-exported via
`packages/agent/src/injection-scanner.ts`). Three pattern sets — role-override,
prompt-extraction, instruction-injection — produce a score; `safe = score < 0.3`
(instruction-injection is weighted higher, 0.6, for `tool_output` context). It gates the
@@ -82,14 +82,9 @@ belong in the vault or a local `.env` (never committed). `.env.example` contains
names plus non-secret development defaults, never live credentials. Callers must
not persist secret values into prompts, logs, or memory frames.
### 6. MCP tool scope gate — `scope.ts`
`packages/memory-mcp/src/scope.ts` + `packages/hive-mind-mcp-server/src/scope.ts`. An
external agent (Claude Code/Codex) granted stdio access to the memory substrate can be
scoped **read-only** via `WAGGLE_MCP_SCOPES` / `HIVE_MIND_SCOPES`: a `memory:read` scope
registers only the read tools, so a read-only client literally cannot call
save/cleanup/ingest. Default (unset) stays full read+write for backward-compat;
`memory:write` implies `memory:read`. This keeps a poisoned or buggy external agent from
writing junk into the substrate.
### 6. MCP tool scope gate (removed)
The memory MCP servers this gate protected are not part of the community edition
(ADR-0002), so no external agent gets stdio access to memory.
### 7. Workspace filesystem boundary + secret deny — `file-store.ts`
`packages/core/src/file-store.ts`. Every FileStore op resolves the caller path and asserts
@@ -106,10 +101,7 @@ sandbox:** the deny is a curated list (it cannot enumerate every secret a home d
is deny-by-default with no per-workspace override yet.
### 8. SSRF egress guard — `url-egress-guard.ts`
`packages/agent/src/url-egress-guard.ts` (guarding `web_fetch` in `system-tools.ts`) and
the structurally-identical `packages/hive-mind-core/src/harvest/url-egress-guard.ts`
(guarding `UrlAdapter.fetchAndParse`, reached by the MCP `ingest_source` url path in
`packages/{memory-mcp,hive-mind-mcp-server}/src/tools/ingest.ts`). A URL named by untrusted
`packages/agent/src/url-egress-guard.ts` (guarding `web_fetch` in `system-tools.ts`). A URL named by untrusted
content or a user is resolved to concrete IP(s); the fetch is **refused if any resolved
address is loopback / private (RFC1918 + CGNAT) / link-local / unique-local / multicast /
reserved / unspecified**. This closes the **cloud instance-metadata** exfiltration path —
@@ -170,6 +162,4 @@ Coverage:
full closure needs IP-pinning (connect to the validated address) which `fetch`+HTTPS can't
do portably without breaking TLS SNI/cert validation. Also out of scope: the guard bounds
the *target* address, not response size/content, and does not defend a genuinely
public-but-malicious endpoint. The duplicated agent/hive-mind-core guard copies share one
spec and must be kept in sync (they cannot share a module — hive-mind-core is OSS-mirrored
and must not import `@waggle/agent`).
public-but-malicious endpoint.