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SECURITY.md

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+# Security Policy
+
+Waggle OS runs on a user's own machine and touches sensitive material — API
+keys, connector credentials, the local filesystem, and imported conversation
+history. We take reports seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.
+
+For the trust boundary, the controls that enforce it, and the currently known
+gaps, read [`THREAT_MODEL.md`](./THREAT_MODEL.md). It is the authoritative
+description of what Waggle defends against and what it does not.
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+**Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.**
+
+Report privately through either channel:
+
+1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred).** On the repository, go to the
+   **Security** tab → **Report a vulnerability**. This opens a private advisory
+   visible only to the maintainers.
+2. **Email.** Send details to **marko@egzakta.com** with `SECURITY` in the
+   subject line.
+
+Please include:
+
+- A description of the issue and the impact you believe it has.
+- Step-by-step reproduction instructions (or a proof of concept).
+- The affected component/package and version or commit SHA.
+- Your environment (OS, Node version, desktop build vs. web).
+
+## What to Expect
+
+- **Acknowledgement** within 5 business days.
+- An initial assessment and severity classification shortly after.
+- Coordinated disclosure: we will agree on a timeline with you and credit you in
+  the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
+
+Please give us a reasonable window to release a fix before any public
+disclosure.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- The desktop app (Tauri shell + bundled sidecar), the web app, and the
+  workspace packages under `packages/` and `apps/`.
+- The memory substrate (`packages/hive-mind-core`) and its MCP servers.
+- Prompt-injection paths, secret handling (the vault), the filesystem boundary,
+  and the capability/approval gates — see `THREAT_MODEL.md` for the details.
+
+Out of scope (documented, not vulnerabilities):
+
+- The known gaps enumerated in `THREAT_MODEL.md` (e.g. the pattern-based
+  injection scanner and the absence of an OS-level shell sandbox). If you can
+  demonstrate impact meaningfully beyond what is already documented there, we
+  still want to hear about it.
+- Findings that require a compromised operator account or physical access to the
+  user's machine — the operator is trusted by design.
+
+## Secrets
+
+If a report involves an exposed secret (an API key, token, or credential), note
+it explicitly so we can rotate it immediately. Never include live secrets in a
+public issue or PR.